The legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd, that colossus of reformational· thinking, presents us not only with the gifts of his systematic genius, but also with the riddles of his unperfected work, which now have become a part of our own unfinished work. Not the least of these riddles and not the least of our unfinished work confront us in the legacy of Dooyeweerd's anthropological reflections. As he indicates in the conclusion of his monumental New Critique, all of his previous investigations are nothing but preliminaries that implicitly converge upon the ultimate problems of philosophical anthropology. 1 The question of man, in effect, constitutes the fundamental implicit theme of Dooyeweerd's philosophy.
The question of man, in effect, constitutes the fundamental implicit theme of Dooyeweerd's philosophy. 2 In this paper I examine a few features of Dooyeweerd's anthropology that persist to present problems. In doing so, more than anything I am seeking answers to questions that I am personally wrestling with in Dooyeweerd's philosophy. Very generally, these questions concern the horizon of time as it marks the relation between body and soul, establishes the limits of theoretical thought in its anthropological reflections, and determines the ways in which Dooyeweerd describes the temporal body and supra-temporal soul. I proceed by sketching a brief outline of Dooyeweerd's anthropology as a background for the discussion of two problems -the problem of the restriction of anthropology to the temporal body, and the problem of possibly conflicting ways of referring to the body-soul relation. Throughout I draw on the work of the late Peter Steen, which relies heavily on the scholarship of D.H.Th. * Author's note: a slightly different version of this article was published under the title of "Soul and Body in the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd" in Tydskrif vir christelike wetenskap 27, no, 1 (991), 57-82. 1 A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 4 vols. trans. W.S. Young, D.H. Freeman, and H. de Jongste (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, and Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1953-58; repr. Jordan Station, Ont.: Paideia Press, 1984) , III, 781: hereafter cited as "NC," followed by volume number and page number. Dooyeweerd's Thought (Toronto: Wedge, 1983 ). This book is an unrevised doctoral dissertation defended in 1970 at Westminster Theological Seminary under the title, "The Idea of Religious Transcendence in the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd , with reference to its significance for Reformed Theology"; hereafter referred to as "Structure." 4 In the research I did for this paper, I was repeatedly amazed at the number of times I found myself mentally reversing myself in some criticism of Dooyeweerd when I discovered that his rationale resulted from a much deeper penetration of an issue that I at first could possibly suspect. I am therefore very conscious of the possibility that I could be entirely mistaken on certain points. 5 Steen, Structure, p. 281. 6 For Vollenhoven, see especially "College systematiek -het probleem van de tijd,"
[194] the past two decades or so the chief momentum within the "school" has at times appeared to be, at best, one of fragmentary development of facets of the Philosophy of the Law Idea, Steen suggests. Even the best efforts at reconstruction have been largely achieved individually and independently of any collective self-identity as a school. 7 Consequently despite its unsurpassed reformational rethinking of the tradition, this philosophy as a system sometimes appears to be on the verge of being disregarded as passé except by a devoted few.
For this reason it is especially noteworthy that this symposium addresses the fundamental issue of anthropology. The basic significance of this issue in its implications for reformational thinking in any area cannot be overestimated.
. Dooyeweerd's Theory of Man
How, then, does Dooyeweerd define the task of philosophical anthropology? He defines it as "an analysis of human bodily existence as an enkaptic structural whole, directed by the aantekeningen J. beings have no temporal qualifying function in -any way require the supra-temporality of the soul or "heart"?
(2) Another incentive for conceiving the soul as a supra-temporal concentration point was doubtless, as Steen suggests, the threat of historicism. 16 Dooyeweerd met this threat, under the influence of Kuyper's concept of the "heart," with a transcendental move granting theoretical thought an "Archimedian point" in the supra-temporally conceived selfhood or "heart." This became the means whereby the modal antithesis of the Gegenstand relation was to be overcome in a theoretical synthesis. Variations of this transcendental move can be found also in the kinds of immanence philosophies (e.g., neo-Kantianism, phenomenology) whose groundless pretense of autonomy Dooyeweerd made a practice of exposing; and it was taken by him to reflect the inner structure of theoretical thought itself.
But why does the need for a transcendental Archimedian point in any way require man himself, in the radical "religious root" of his human nature, to be above time 18 Steen speaks of man's judgment. Dooyeweerd gave an interesting reply. First he said, 'faith turns into sight and therefore faith passes away.' When I mentioned the fact that Paul emphasizes that faith abides, he stressed the fact that we really know nothing about the future after the judgment. When I then asked how it would be possible to conceive of a resurrected man without all the functions and the law spheres holding, he seemed to reconsider his previous statement and agree that I was laying my finger on an important point." (Steen, Structure, p. 85) 16 Steen, Structure, esp. p. 268f. 17 Steen indicates that the term "above time" (hoventijdelijk) was abandoned by Dooyeweerd in his later years under intense criticism, in favor of the expression "religious transcendence." Yet, according to Steen, this substitution by no means represented a change in Dooyeweerd's own understanding of the whole structure to which the former term applied, but rather a concession to what he regarded as a misunderstanding that had arisen concerning the whole complex of ideas involved (Structure p. 6 n. 6). 18 Popma's views are expressed throughout his writings; see especially Levensbeschouwing, 7 vols. (see above, n. 6), cited by Steen, Structure, p. 302, n. 37. Geertsema's views were expressed in his paper by the title of "Homo respondens," see above.
reaching out to God beyond the cosmos in response to revelation as a "religious transcending" that in no sense entails supra-temporality, but, rather, a "standing above himself as limited to his present existence"; he calls it "a transcendence of time, history, and creation within time, history and creation." 19 Zuidema, in fact, is reported to have spoken in this connection of a "transcendence in immanence, or in time." 20 Here transcendence is understood as an attribute of human consciousness, not human being;
and it is made possible only through responding to the temporally manifested testimony of divine revelation. 21 So, again, why does the necessity of human self-transcendence in any way require the super-temporality of the human being himself?
(3) Yet another rationale for regarding the soul as supra-temporal is found in Dooyeweerd's understanding of "creation" in the first two chapters of Genesis. This particular understanding requires that the creation of all human souls, individually and collectively, be regarded as completed, on the basis of Steen says "it appears that Dooyeweerd is saying that the human race as a totality represented in Adam and Eve (stamvader en stammoeder) was created by God in the beginning. All that will unfold and be subject to the temporal process of becoming is present here as finished creation. There would seem to be a root community of hearts represented in the heart of the first representative root, Adam." (Structure, p. 65). 23 Steen observes; "Dooyeweerd intimates that reality as it exists through temporal becoming and supra-temporal generation had a pre-existence in the Spirit of God; it exists as created, as finished creation. It is this finished existing creation that now becomes in the great becoming process." (Structure, p. 66f., cf. p. 52f.) One might wish to ask, then: What is the supra-temporal existence of the soul? (On the concept of aevum, or created eternity, in Dooyeweerd, see his "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieen op het immanentie-standpunt," Philosophia reformata 4 (939), 4-5; cited by Steen, Structure, p. 132, n. 9).
finished, supra-temporal creation is seen as embracing the whole man -both body and soul (TM, XXXII). This [199] means, as Steen writes, that the "whole man becomes both body and heart since both are subject to generation, the body to a temporal generation and the heart or soul to a supra-temporal generation process .... From the created whole man, that is, the heart, the whole man becomes." 24 In this way, Dooyeweerd's interpretation of the biblical account of creation requires the soul to be conceived as inherently supra-temporal.
While I am not altogether confident about my theological competence to judge these matters, the chief impression I receive from them is that a simple exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2 could not possibly have produced so complicated scenario. Much more could be said about this; but as some of the implications of Dooyeweerd's view will be seen in more detail later, this must suffice here. So, again, why does the biblical account of creation require in any way the conception of the supra-temporality of the human soul?
The Demarcation of the Temporal in Dooyeweerd
Before turning to the fourth, quite different, motive for conceiving the soul as supratemporal, it may be helpful to take a closer look at Dooyeweerd's precise demarcation of the temporal horizon. In the scholastic tradition, the distinction between eternity and time has always marked in some sense the biblical distinction between Creator and creation. This is true also, in some sense, in Dooyeweerd. There have been historical problems, of course, in how eternity has been conceived in marking this distinction.
Since the time of Boethius, and possibly since the pre-Socratics, one line of thinking has conceived of God's eternity as an "eternal present" (nunc aeternum), whereas under the influence of Oscar Cullmann a more recent line of thinking has conceived of it in a linear fashion. 25 But whatever the problems in conceiving of eternity or time, the 24 The fact that the generation of both soul (supra-temporally) and body (temporally) derive from the pre-existence of the already created whole man, understood as entirely contained in the heart or soul as the radical religious root of personality, underscores the claims of those who, following Vollenhoven's problem-historical method, find some sort of "priority theme" or "monarchian" element in Dooyeweerd's thinking, along with some variety of "instrumentalism" and "impetus theory" (see, e.g., Vollenhoven's "De consequent probleemhistorische methode," Philosophia reformata 26 (961) God is not subject to the conditions of his creation.
However, the demarcation between time and eternity in Dooyeweerd's thought would not be understood accurately if it were thought simply to [200] coincide with this distinction. For it seems, rather, to follow another established tradition of scholastic reflection in conceiving of time and eternity as marking the boundary between the natural and the supernatural, where these are understood as referring to the seen and unseen creation. As such, the distinction between time and eternity marks a boundary within creation -between the visible and the invisible. This invisible side of creation, of course, includes not only angels, such as Gabriel; and archangels, such as Michael; and cherubim; and seraphim; and fallen angels, such as Lucifer; and the departed saints mentioned in Scripture; but also the soul as Dooyeweerd understands it -the soul in its created pre-existence, its supra-temporal generation, and its character as supra-temporal "root" and "concentration point" of the individual person incarnate in time.
(4) In this context it becomes meaningful to ask whether another possible motive of Dooyeweerd's for conceiving the soul as supra-temporal is because, in some sense, it is invisible. I grant that he does not use this perceptual terminology, but I wonder whether the issue is not lodged somewhere in the margins of his philosophy. Along with the angels and the souls of departed saints, the "heart" or "soul" of the live, flesh-and-blood individual, for Dooyeweerd, is in some sense inaccessible. It lies beyond the horizon of theoretical thought. "As soon as we try to grasp it in a concept or definition," he says, "it recedes as a phantom and resolves itself into nothingness." 26 Accordingly, "not any science whatever can make it into its 'Gegenstand" (NC, 11, 115 The parallels with Scheler's view of the "person" are remarkable here. Much as in Dooyeweerd's view the "soul" or "heart" can never be objectified, so for Scheler the "person" can never become an object of analysis; much as in Dooyeweerd's view "acts" come forth out of the soul but only function within the temporal structure of the human body, so for Scheler the person acts into time without himself being in time. For Scheler's distinction between "acts" arid "functions," and significant differences in his view of the actstructure, see Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd seems to place the soul and everything concerning the unseen creation decisively beyond the horizon of theoretical thought and, thereby, to preclude the testimony of Scripture concerning these matters from furnishing objective content for theoretical reflection. And he seems to do this in two ways: first, by regarding knowledge about such matters at some level as supra-theoretical, religiously concentrated "heart" knowledge, belonging to the radically time-transcending soul; and second, by regarding knowledge about such matters as the presupposition of every theoretical conception (cf. TM, VI).
At some level, certainly, the knowledge about the soul and the unseen creation that is spiritually discerned by hearing the testimony of Scripture is pre-theoretical knowledge.
As such it furnishes the presuppositions that constitute the ground motive of Christian theorizing. But at another level, such knowledge also furnishes some of the basic objective contents of knowledge about which we theoretically reflect. As such, it provides both [201] the key presuppositions and the key conceptual constituents in our contrasts this emphasis with that of man as a seeing being in the theo-ontological tradition, and with man as a questioning being in Heideggerian philosophy (cf. Steen, Structure, p. 302, n. 37). 30 Steen, despite noting Dooyeweerd's development of "a unique aversion towards citing proof-texts in his works" as a result of his early confrontations with Reformed theologians, and despite noting Dooyeweerd's consequent failure to appreciate the rich discovery of Scripture in recent developments within the exegetical branches of theology, and despite noting that this may be (ironically) part of the reason for a residuum of nature-grace influence in his philosophy, nevertheless speaks of "the rich biblical emphasis ", always present in Dooyeweerd." (Structure, pp. 20, 272; cf. p. 127, n. 2).
theoretical reflection about man, The hermeneutical circularity involved in the relation between these two levels poses a problem no greater than that involved in any attempt to explain understanding and interpretation, 31 Much rather, the attempt to preclude the understanding derived from Scripture from functioning on both levels, and thus also on the level of theoretical knowledge, seems not only unwarranted and arbitrary; it seems to conflict fundamentally with Dooyeweerd's own practice, in which we see him grounding his theory of man at many critical points in a painstaking, intricate theoretical reflection on the Scripture's testimony about the "heart" and "soul."
It is another question altogether whether Dooyeweerd's theoretical reflections faithfully reflect this testimony. His view that the soul exists supra-temporally in a created eternity, or "aevum," appears to conflict with Scripture at decisive points. Steen, for example, after examining two passages (Rev. 10: 6 and 6: 10), insists that they show "unmistakably that Scripture does not hesitate in the least to think of the heavenly angels and departed saints as subject to cosmic time and historical events and of these creatures as having a strong time consciousness in this state," 32 Further, if an implication of Dooyeweerd's view is that "outside of the body no acts are possible," as he states (TM, XX), this would also appear to conflict with biblical testimony, in which such acts are not only possible but part and parcel of redemptive history.
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It may be objected that such recourse to the testimony of Scripture is nothing more than a naive lapse into "biblicism"; that divine Word revelation is a matter ultimately of integral, religious "heart" knowledge that transcends the temporal horizon of theoretical analysis; that the act-structure is by definition one of the individuality-structures of the temporal body and cannot properly refer to anything beyond cosmic time or to anything Somewhat ironically, however, I cannot help wondering whether, in Dooyeweerd's intricate conception of "creation" and "becoming" there is not a hint of the kind of metaphysical speculation that he so carefully tries .to avoid. His view of supratemporally created souls becomes precariously close, at points, to the ideal pre-existence of hypostatized personal essences constituted by the creative intentionality of a divine mind. 36 The fact that the individual "root" or "concentration point" participates in the cosmic supra-individual "root" or "concentration point" of the creation at least suggests, as Steen notes, a "macro-microcosm theme in Dooyeweerd." 37 There is a pronounced quasi-supralapsarian, quasi-Christomonistic tendency to conflate creation, fall, and redemption in the "eternal now" of Christ as root of the new creation, much as in 34 Although Dooyeweerd says that "all human acts have their origin in the soul," and therefore beyond time, he holds that they function only within the temporal structure of the human body (TM, XX: cf XIV). For this reason he opposes the phenomenology of Husserl and Scheler, which regards acts as "incorporeal (onlichamelijk), (pure 'psychonomic') intentional experiences" (TM, XV bodily existence where it is subject to conceptual understanding, and, on the other, in its supra-temporal spiritual concentration where it is said to transcend conceptual understanding altogether? Is this acceptable? Is it true that, in order to avoid the dangers of metaphysical speculation, we must, in typical Kantian fashion, adopt a definition of the temporal horizon that excludes from the subject matter of our anthropology, as off limits, that which is most basic in man -his heart and soul? Is it true that the Scripture reveals nothing of the essence of human existence about which we may theoretically reflect, but only something that can be pre-theoretically presupposed?
Here it seems we are faced with problems that are not wholly unlike those we encounter On the "participation idea" see Steen, Structure, p. 209: on the collapse of structure into direction see Ibi.,, p. 83, where Steen writes: "It might be said that structure tends to be reduced to direction .. , Structure is transcendentally-directed meaning. Meaninglessness, nothing, and meaning loss tend to occur when this direction is lost. The structure is almost its pointing character." Steen finds in this state of affairs what he calls the "semicontradictory theme" in Dooyeweerd's thought. 40 Steen, Structure, p. 83f.
discussions of "moral feeling," "respect" and "duty," where we find man described in the familiar language of moral experience -at that very point, we find him revisited by all the devils of metaphysics of purism and its dualizations of the rational and the sensible, the formal and the material, the noumenal and the phenomenal. Man as manin the preeminent sense of moral agent, as responsible personality, as personalitas moralis, as the seat of personal dignity and moral worth embodied in the rational will -is effectively cut off from the world of human experience. The personalitas moralis is also homo noumenon, inscrutable, unknowable, inaccessible -not only to others, but even to himself.
Likewise, it seems, at the very point where Dooyeweerd seems most promising -in his stalwart defense of the integral unity of human existence that we find confirmed by our own experience -at that very point we find him revisited by the very legacy of dualizations that he strove to overcome. Alongside the freshly conceived functional unity of man we find another rift mysteriously opening between the temporal and the supra-temporal, between the structural unity and the spiritual unity, between what is theoretically analyzable and what is beyond all analysis. 
Tbe Second Problem: Opposed Ways of Referring to Body and Soul
This brings us to our second problem. Dooyeweerd appears to refer to the relation between the body and soul in. two, quite different ways. On the one-hand, he seems to say that the two are inseparable, that they are two ways of referring to the same individual, that they are identical to "man." On the other hand, he seems to say that they are separable (if not from "man," then at least from each other), that they refer to two quite different dimensions of man (if not to distinct entities), that they are different from one another (if not from "man"),
Hence, on the one hand, Dooyeweerd can write: "The human body is man himself in the structural whole of his temporal appearance. The heart is not a part of man, but his full 'self,' or, as he says, 'our egoicity as the radical unity of our existence,' 'the religious center of our existence,' which should not be confused with 'anyone of the modal aspects of the temporal horizon.' 43 Continuing, he notes that for Dooyeweerd the heart is not a reduction of man to some core, from which the periphery -the body -can easily be removed, The 'prefunctional heart' is not something which should be placed outside its functions, as a new substance which then is joined to the body's function-complex and which can be separated from it at death 44 On the other hand, Dooyeweerd can say that the soul or spirit is "not subject to temporal death," whereas "the body can never be thought of as 'self-contained' or as a 'substance,' since the body will disintegrate when its tie to the soul is severed" (TM, V, IX). Berkouwer represents Dooyeweerd's position as conforming to the scriptural view that the soul "is not affected by temporal death, but after the end of the body (i.e., of all the temporal aspects of man), it continues as a form of existence with an individuality structure." 45 In fact, in an early article, Dooyeweerd refers to the "religious kernel of our personality" (de religieuze kern onzer persoonlijkheid) as "the eternal, immortal in man"
(eeuwige, ontsteifelijke in den mensch What Dooyeweerd appears to be seeking is a course between the Scylla of "substantialist" theories that locate the being of man in an independent essence that underlies and subsists through his acts, and the Charybdis of "actualistic" theories that locate the being of man in his acts. At this point his position resembles that of Scheler.
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Berkouwer describes it as follows: "Dooyeweerd holds that besides functionalism and substantialism there is a third alternative; namely, that we cannot view man's essence in itself and then place it in a relation to God ... Anyone who is attracted to the philosophy of substance will see in the idea that man's relation to God is essential to his essence, a 47 H. Dooyeweerd, "Ter nagedachtenis van mijn vriend Prof. dr, Ph. Kohnstamm," Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte (Sept., 1952), p. 11; cited in Steen, "Time and Eternity," p. 144, n. 16, and in Structure, p. 115, n. 129, and p. 130. 48 See Berkouwer's discussion of.relevant biblical passages in Man, pp. 264ff., and cf. Heidelberg Catechism (Lord's Day 22). 49 Scheler's position is precariously subtle: the "person" is neither exhausted in his "acts" nor something subsisting through their temporal succession, but, rather, a supra-temporal being who acts into time and who "is and experiences himself only as a being that executes acts"; the "whole person is contained in every fully concrete act, and the whole person 'varies' in and through every act -without being exhausted in his being in any of these acts, and without 'changing' like a thing in time" (Formalism us, p. 395f, [English translation, p. 385] ; see above, n. 27, for full references).
sort of actualism which does away with man's independent existence in a relational emphasis. But this criticism is nothing else than a reaction to the dangers of real actualism and functionalism, which stress relation to the extent of ignoring reality. There is also the possibility that stressing man's relation to God does not at all threaten or obscure or dissolve reality, but rather helps us to understand the nature of this reality in its dependence on God." 50
Conclusions
If I have not misrepresented Dooyeweerd in the foregoing, I think there are at least three problem areas that require attention. These concern his views of substance, temporal bodily existence, and the horizon of theoretical thought.
(1 ) In his unimpeachable effort to avoid de Scylla of substantialism, Dooyeweerd appears to have left his position without a clear language for speaking of individualspeople, bodies, souls, or even things. Zigterman offers a brief discussion of this problem in his critical assessment of Dooyeweerd's theory of individuality structures. 51 The problem surfaces overtly in the equivocal statements we have seen concerning the "heart" and "soul." What does Berkouwer mean, for instance, when he speaks of man's "reality" in the foregoing quotation? What does he mean when he says that the heart is not a "core, from which the periphery -the body -can easily be removed"? 52 59 There is no inherent reason, on this ground, why things and people could not be spoken of in the language of substance, although one might wish to insist on the cautionary qualification of "created substance," "dependent substance," or, with an eye to the unique status of man as the image of God, "image substance." The language of substance would permit a way of overcoming the equivocity of Dooyeweerd's language about things and people by permitting clear references to them as having relatively stable identities that subsist through change, while yet avoiding the classic and scholastic view that substance is self-sufficient being.
It would permit one to overcome speaking of things in such a way that there is nothing of which their functions are functions, as if all that existed were a coherent between, inter-functions, which are never functions of anything. It would permit one to overcome the equivocity of speaking of persons as though they had supra-temporal, suprafunctional souls that survive bodily death and, at the same time, as if their souls were not separable "parts" of their integral being. Finally, when properly understood, it would
give clearer expression to the significance of God's creative act and the reality of creation without in any way compromising the creaturely dependence of that reality.
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(2 ) As may be gathered from our earlier discussion, there is an implicit tendency in Dooyeweerd's anthropology to identify the essence of the person with the soul, not the body. It is the whole man in his supra-temporal concentration that survives the· death of the body. This is also the position, for example, of John Cooper in his Reformed Journal only to a metaphysics of substance when they are applied to created things, which have no supra-temporal unity. 59 In this connection, Berkouwer's comment is significant that "anti-dualism as such is not a guarantee of a true insight into human nature" (M an, p. 222). 60 In this context, Dooyeweerd's reading of Stoker seems misleading. When Stoker suggests that his concept of substance gives a better expression to "the autonomous being and value of the cosmos with respect to God" (die eien ziJn en die eienwaarde van die kosmos teenover God), Dooyeweerd fears that the radical biblical view of the dependence of all creation upon God is somehow being threatened (NC, III, 71) . But this overlooks precisely the point Stoker is affirming: namely, the real difference instituted between the Creator and His creation by the very act of creating. Accordingly, creation is not self· sufficient; but it is not nothing; it is something. (Cf. Zigterman, op.cit., pp. 129, 132, 136.) article, where he uses the term "soul" and "person" interchangeably in contrast to "body." 61 A possible danger of such a position is that it may lead to a consideration of the body as somehow secondary, if not altogether dispensable. This seems quite clearly to be what happens in the case of Dooyeweerd, who compounds matters by identifying the soul with the supra-temporal aevum. The result is an unintentional and uncharacteristic devaluation of all that is corporeal, earthly and temporal, and a verticalized eschatology that all but loses sight of the import of the bodily resurrectiona fact underlined by the striking observation of Steen that "Dooyeweerd never mentions the new earth in all his works," which, to say the least, is "a striking omission in the light of his mammoth corpus." 62 [209] This state of affairs is embedded in a complex of relations in Dooyeweerd's philosophy involving, as we have seen, quasi-supralapsarian and quasi-Christomonistic tendencies,
as well as what some, following Vollenhoven, have referred to as his "dichotomistic Monarchianism" or "priority theme," and tendency toward "instrumentalism" or "impetus theory" (see above, n. 24). Short of attempting to sort through this, perhaps the simplest steps towards a resolution of the most aggravating problems would include the following: first, an extension of the horizon of temporality to encompass both the seen and the unseen creation, and, accordingly, the soul; and second, an acknowledgment that death in some sense sunders the unity of man, such that the soul of the departed is not fully "man' in the full-bodied, incarnate sense he was created to be and will again be in the resurrection. These steps should help to restore the horizontal, historical dimension of the eschaton and enable a more biblically consistent discussion of the body in light of the nobility and dignity assigned to it within the scriptural scope of creation and redemption. As Berkouwer says, "this affirmation of the body's worth has always been a skandalon to every dualistic theory of gradation between higher and lower elements in man." 63 We must recover the centrality of this skandalon in our thinking about man.
(3) As we have seen, Dooyeweerd regards the soul as incapable of becoming an object of theoretical analysis. As supra-temporal, it transcends the horizon and conditions of theoretical thought; and, as a matter of religious "heart" knowledge, it can only serve as 
